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Previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour 
supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility 
function. This paper shows that this is only permissible if the household allocates income exactly 
in accordance with the distributional parameters of the usual kind of individualistic social welfare 
function. To analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case, we construct a simple but 
fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium 
of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities, as determined by the 
household resource allocation process. 
1. Introduction 
For some purposes, it may be a harmless simplification to model the 
family, or household, as if it were a single individual, who maximises the 
usual kind of utility function subject to constraints on income and time. This 
approach has been adopted in a number of recent papers on taxation and 
welfare measurement.’ The seminal work by Becker (1974) provides a 
rationale in terms of what could be called a theory of the benevolent 
patriarch. The household has a head who cares for the welfare of the other 
members and allocates the household resources among them. The household 
utility function is then that of the head, whose ‘concern for the welfare of 
other members, so to speak, integrates all the members’ utility functions into 
one consistent “family function”‘.2 Where policy studies based on this 
approach require specific assumptions about the intra-household distribution 
of welfare, the common practice is to assume they are all equally well oK3 
*We are grateful to the referees for very thorough and helpful appraisals of this paper. 
‘See, for example, Pollak and Wales (1981), Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), King (1983), 
Blundell and Walker (1984), Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986), Ray (1982), and Blundell et al. 
(1986). 
2Becker (1974, p. 1079). 
3For example, see Blackorby and Donaldson (1987). 
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though this is usually presented as an assumption faute de mieux rather than 
as a fact, however stylised.4 
We want to show in this paper, however, that in analysing policy issues 
involving individual welfares, for example income taxation, the household 
utility function approach is seriously inadequate and should be generalised. 
We maintain that this is essential to retain the individual as the basic unit of 
analysis, while acknowledging that individuals’ utilities are determined by 
processes of resource allocation within the households they form. The effects 
of policy changes on individual utilities are mediated through the household 
allocation process. The household utility function approach requires that the 
distribution of utility within the household is optimal relative to whatever 
distributional preferences the policy-maker may have, so that all that then 
matters for the analysis of inequality and taxation is the distribution of 
income across households. This seems to us to be unnecessarily restrictive as 
well as unconvincing. We prefer to retain the possibility of dissonance 
between social and household distributional preferences and to analyze its 
implications. 
Accordingly we adopt an alternative approach which preserves the indi- 
vidualistic elements of the situation. Households consist of two members, 
whom we label, following convention, male and female. Each supplies effort 
to household production and may also do so to an outside labour market. 
They have to choose jointly time allocations and consumptions of domestic 
and market goods. We make the substantive assumption that the equilibrium 
allocation is Pareto efficient. This implies a separation between time allo- 
cation and consumption allocation decisions. Each allocates his/her time so 
as to equalise marginal value product in domestic production with the 
market wage rate (with the usual reservations for a corner solution). This 
determines total amounts of outside income and domestic production. They 
then negotiate an allocation of these and, given that the resulting consump- 
tion allocation is Pareto efficient, it can be represented as a point on the 
contract curve or in the core of an Edgeworth exchange game. 
This set of exchange equilibria could be narrowed down in several ways. 
One obvious way is to assume some specific type of bargaining outcome, for 
example the Nash bargaining solution, as in Manser and Brown (1980) and 
McElroy and Horney (1981). Alternatively, if one assumes there is a 
competitive market in domestic contracts, then we have the Walrasian model 
of Apps (1981, 1982) and Apps and Jones (1986). The terms of trade at 
which intra-household exchange takes place are exogenous to the individual 
household but determined by the aggregate net demands for domestic and 
market outputs across all households. 
4For a convincing argument that equality could not in general be regarded as fact, see Sen 
(1983). 
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In this paper we do not want to restrict analysis to any particular 
exchange or bargaining equilibrium: we simply make use of the conditions 
that characterise any efficient allocation. As long as the household resource 
allocation is Pareto efficient, it satisfies the conditions5 which follow from 
maximising a weighted sum of the utilities of household members subject to 
the resource and budget constraints. We call this weighted sum a ‘household 
welfare function’.(j In using such a function, we stress that we do not see the 
household as necessarily ‘agreeing upon’ a household welfare function and 
then maximising it - for us it is an as if construction which is nevertheless 
useful in clarifying some points we wish to make about income taxation. It 
can be regarded as generalising the household utility function without serious 
loss of tractability. Its justification is simply that any Pareto-efficient 
consumption allocation implies some specific welfare weights by which the 
household welfare function can be constructed. 
In analysing the effects of changes in tax parameters on the household 
equilibrium we find it useful to exploit another well-known property of a 
Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Any Pareto-efficient resource allocation (we 
make the usual convexity assumptions) can be sustained by a particular price 
given an appropriate initial distribution of endowments. Thus, we could think 
of the household as first of all imputing to the individual members an 
income given by their earnings from outside labour supply plus the individual 
of their domestic production: then, possibly, making lump-sum redistribu- 
tions between themselves; and then trading outside consumption for domestic 
output at a tixed price, to reach their final equilibrium. This as if construc- 
tion is useful in deriving the comparative statics of the household equili- 
brium, but again we stress that it is not intended as a literal description of 
how households behave. The substantive assumption we make is that the 
household equilibrium allocation of time and consumption is Pareto efficient, 
and so is in the set of exchange equilibria of the household viewed as a small 
economy. 
2. The model of the household 
In the household model both woman, f, and man, m, supply time to 
production of a household good, m certainly supplies time to the outside 
labour market and f may or may not do so. The income from outside labour 
SNote that any particular model of the household will have more structure and so more 
specitic equilibrium conditions than those which correspond to Pareto efficiency. However, all 
the household models that have been proposed have Pareto efficiency as a common element, 
and it is useful to see what can be said at this level of generality. 
6By analogy with the social welfare function for an economy as a whole. In fact this type. of 
approach was suggested by Samuelson (1965), and can be regarded as a straightforward 
generalisation of Becker’s patriarchal - or, in social choice terms, dictatorial - family utility 
function. 
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supply is entirely spent on buying in a composite consumption good. For 
simplicity, no bought-in goods are required as intermediate goods in 
household production and household capital is assumed fixed and therefore 




=i’s consumption of the bought-in good, 
= i’s consumption of the domestic good, 
=i’s time spent in domestic production, 
=i’s time supplied to the outside labour market, 
wi =i’s wage rate on the outside labour market, 
@i = i’s lump-sum transfer from government, 
1 - /Ji = the marginal tax rate on i’s wage income, 
i =f, m. 
The price of the bought-in good is unity. The household production function 
is: 
y,+y,=y=h(tr, t,), h,>O, i=f, m. (1) 
h is linear homogeneous and strictly quasi-concave, m and f are allowed to 
have differing productivities but we assume constant returns to scale. Each 
individual faces the time constraint. 
ti+Ii= IT; i=f, m, (2) 
and has the utility function, 
ui = ui(xi, y,), uj > 0, i = f, m, j = x, y, ui is strictly concave. (3) 
These utility functions are cardinal and do not include time per se - utility 
depends only indirectly on time allocations, and the compensated response 
to, say, a tax on the market wage would take the form of a substitution of 
time spent in domestic production for time supplied to the market. There is 
no ‘pure leisure’ in this model. 
Each individual receives an amount of the consumption good in the form 
of a lump-sum transfer from government and (possibly) net of tax wage 
income, given by 
Xi = Cti + PiWili, i = f, m, 
and this implies that total feasible consumption of the market good is 
x=cxi, (4) 
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We assume ti, xi and yi are all strictly positive in the neighbourhood of an 
optimum and consider only the non-negativity conditions: 
IizO, i=f,m. (5) 
Our general view of the decision-taking process is tha& the household 
resource allocation is Pareto efficient, and so we can take it that f and m 
choose a household resource allocation (Xi, yi, ti, ri) given the constraints 
(1)+5) as if to maximise the household welfare function, 
w=u’+&4”, (6) 
where 6 ~0 is the welfare weight implied by the actual equilibrium resource 
allocation of the household, however achieved. 
In general, the maximisation is subject also to the conditions: 
Ui(Xi, yi) 2 u’, i=f, m, (7) 
where ui represents the minimal utility level i requires to remain within the 
household, i.e. it is a reservation utility level. We shall, however, assume for 
the moment that the equilibrium resource allocation is always such as to 
satisfy (7) as a strict inequality ~ each party does at least a little better being 
in the household than outside it -- and so as a constraint (7) can be ignored 
(but see section 4 below). 
The household equilibrium resource allocation can then be characterised 
by the conditions: 
u’,=i=&” 
x9 (8) 
ll;. = p = sup, (9) 
$?=T~, i=f,m, (10) 
ifiisri, lizO, li(~BiWi-Ti)=O, i=f,m, (11) 
and all constraints (except that on reservation utilities) are assumed strictly 
binding at the optimum. p, ri and A are Lagrange multipliers associated with 
the production function, time constraints and budget constraint, respectively. 
If li>O, (I 1) implies: 
b’iwi = phi, (12) 
where p=p/;I is the implicit price, in terms of the bought-in consumption 
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good, that the household places on the domestically produced good at the 
optimum. Thus, i’s time is allocated so as to equalise its marginal value 
product in household production with its opportunity cost outside the 
household. If Zi> ~Biwi, then li =O, i works only within the household, and 
the marginal value product phi exceeds i’s outside opportunity cost. Note 
that in this model the issue of whether either party will specialise entirely in 
household production is determined by the relation between the relative 
value of the household good, his/her marginal productivity in household 
production, the given market wage rate and the tax rate.7 
We now develop an interpretation of the household equilibrium allocation 
on which our analysis of taxation will be based. Since the household 
produces efficiently, it can be regarded as solving the cost-minimisation 
problem: 
minxfliwi(T-li) S.t. y=h(T-I,, T-l,), Ii?& i=f,m, (13) 
for any given domestic output y. This implies the household cost function, 
C(Bf% PmWnV y). Moreover, h linear homogeneous implies that the cost 
function takes the form c(/Irwn P,,,w,,,) .y, where c is the unit cost function. Then 
is the demand function for i’s domestic labour, and l&w,, &wm, y) = T - qy 
is the supply function of i’s market labour. Since c is the marginal cost 
of producing the domestic good, we must have, for efficiency, p =c, and this 
can be confirmed from conditions (10) and (11) (noting that 
c= fl,w,/h,=&w,/h,). It follows therefore that in this model, because of the 
constant returns to scale assumption, the price of domestic consumption is 
fully determined by the net of tax wage rates, and we have: 
ap 
aEi= wici; , g=O, i=f,m, (14) 
where ci has the usual interpretation as the input-output coefficient of labour 
of type i, (T - l,)/y. 
Given the net-of-tax wage rates fiiwi, once efficient labour supplies have 
been determined the household’s available ‘endowments’ of consumption 
goods x and y are determined by (1) and (4). There then follows a Pareto- 
efficient allocation of these, which satisfies conditions (8) and (9) and brings 
the common marginal rate of substitution between x and y into equality with 
‘In everything that follows we shall assume that both m and f supply labour to the outside 
market, so that the conditions in (11) hold as strict equalities. It is straightforward to apply our 
results to the case of a corner solution. 
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p. As is well known, any Pareto-efficient solution to an allocation process 
can be viewed as achievable by exchange at a fixed price, given appropriate 
initial endowments. Thus, consider the individual fill-income budget 
constraints: 
xi+pyi=si+Piwili+phiti=si+~iwiT=li, i=f, m, (15) 
where i is credited with an income in which time spent in domestic 
production is valued at an implicit wage rate equal to phi. Since time 
allocation is efficient, phi=Biwi and SO the income side of the budget 
constraint reduces to full income at the net of tax market wage rate. si is the 
lump-sum endowment of income to i implied by the household equilibrium, 
and is the net result of the government lump-sum payment cli and an implicit 
intra-household transfer. Thus, 1 si = 1 C(i. Then, given appropriate choice of 
the si, the consumption allocation implied by conditions (8) and (9) can be 
sustained as a competitive allocation by the price p. We can also define the 
indirect utility functions u’(p, li), with, in the usual way, &f/dp= -Aiyi, 
&1’/~3l,= &I’/c%,z~,~, the marginal utility of i’s income. Since the si are defined 
in such a way that conditions (8) and (9) are satisfied, it follows that 
i,=6&,-~, which can be called the marginal household utility of income. 
Thus, the transfers Si optimise the distribution of income within the 
household, in terms of the implicit household welfare function. It is as if the 
household solved the problem 
max O’(p, If) + 6U”(p, I,) St. If + Im=C(Cli + PiWiT), (16) 
Sf. Sm 
with p fixed. 
The purpose of this interpretation of the household resource allocation in 
terms of cost minimisation and efficient consumption allocation is to 
facilitate the analysis of taxation. The effect of a change in tax parameters is 
of course to change the household’s allocation of labour, the total amounts 
of x and y available, and the allocation of these between individuals. The 
change in the consumption allocation equilibrium can be fully described in 
terms of changes in p and the Ii, and, as is usual with the use of duality, this 
simplifies the analysis of the welfare effects of the change. 
3. Welfare effects of tax changes 
Our first proposition is that when evaluating the welfare effects of tax 
changes, the intra-household distributional effects cannot in general be 
ignored, and will be an important determinant of tax policy. This rests on 
the assumption that the social welfare function is defined on individual 
utilities, as is usually the case in welfare economics. To sharpen the results, 
J.P.E.- D 
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we assume that the social welfare function takes the form of a simple sum of 
individual utilities. Moreover, to establish the main results it suffices simply 
to consider a single household. Thus, suppose the social welfare function 
takes the form: 
S=CU’(p,Ii), i=f,m. (17) 
A normative tax analysis in essence always compares the marginal social 
welfare of a tax parameter to its marginal social tax cost (the partial 
derivative of an appropriately defined tax revenue constraint).% Since the 
latter will be standard, we concentrate on the former. Thus, we have: 
g,=C;iz.=xAi!$, i,j=f,m, 
I J J 
C3S 
gq= I( ad ap al, --+i.$jj ) ap Vj 1 i,j=f,m. 




Now if 6= 1, so that the implicit weight each individual receives in the 
household welfare function is exactly that received in the social welfare 
function, we have simply: 
as 
daj=)19 (21) 
and the precise impact on the change in lump sum on the household income 
distribution is irrelevant. However, if 6 # 1 then, this is no longer true. For 
example, if 6 > 1, then from (20), GS/&xj will be smaller, the greater the share 
of any increase in the lump sum paid to either individual that accrues to m, 
(&,/aclj), and conversely. That is, the lump sum is less useful as a 
redistributive instrument across indioiduals, the greater the marginal share 
taken by the individual who is ‘overweighted’ in the household income 
distribution, from the point of view of the social welfare function. We could 
think of the value l/6 as a measure of the dissonance between the implicit 
household and the actual social welfare functions. Only where no such 
*Thus, an optimal tax is characterised by equating these, a desirable direction of tax reform is 
found by comparing their values at some initial non-optimal point. 
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dissonance exists can the household be regarded as having a well-defined 
marginal utility of income independent of intra-household distribution effects. 





using the results of the previous section, and noting that 
(22) 
al, asi arj_ asj 
agj agj’ aBj-(?pj+Wj7; i,j=f,m, i#j. 
Moreover, x(8si/agj) =0 since csi=c q. It again follows that if 6 = 1, so 
that /lr = A,,, = q, then 
as ~ = rfWjlj. 
Vj 
(23) 
Thus, again intra-household distributional effects are irrelevant. This is the 
type of result familiar from the analysis of optimal taxation for individuals or 
for a household with a single utility function: 9 the marginal social welfare of 
the marginal tax rate is proportional to the tax base. The substitution 
between domestic and market time is irrelevant since they have the same 




as, 1 as, 
afir ~ =vwr~r+v a+zap,+(l -y)w,t, 1 ) (24) 
(25) 
In these expressions, y -(yr+ y,/6)/y, is a distributional characteristic in the 
sense of Feldstein (1972). It gives the sum of shares of household members’ 
consumptions of the domestic good, weighted by the ‘dissonance parameter’. 
It takes a value of 1 when y,/y= 1, and of l/6 when y,/y=O, and differs from 
1 only if 6#1. 
The basic idea underlying these expressions is as follows. A change in j’s 
marginal tax rate will cause changes in the allocation of each individual’s 
time between market and household production, the total amounts of the 
‘See, for example, Boskin and Sheshinski (1983). 
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two goods to be allocated between them and so a change in equilibrium 
allocations. Since the latter are Pareto efficient, these changes can be 
expressed in terms of the changes in the imputed income distribution and 
price which sustain the equilibrium. Thus, in (24), the first two terms inside 
the square brackets give the effect on the household income distribution. If 
6 > 1 (m is overweighted in the household utility function) and &,/ap,>O (a 
reduction in her marginal tax rate improves f’s share of the total lump-sum 
payment to the household) then (as,/all,)+(l/s)(as~Jap,)>O. That is, the 
reduction in f’s marginal tax rate has, from the point of view of the social 
welfare function, a beneficial effect on the household income distribution. 
This then increases the value of LJS/Z&. The marginal social benefit of a 
reduction in f’s marginal tax rate would now be greater than in the case 
where household distributional effects are ignored. 
The third term in the brackets in (24), (1 - y)w,t,, summarises two effects. A 
change in the marginal tax rate will change f’s imputed income from 
domestic production, since this is valued at the after-tax wage rate. Against 
this is set the effect of a change in f’s net of tax wage on the marginal cost 
and price of the domestic good, and this effect is proportional to the value of 
f’s time spent in domestic production (recall that ap/aflj = wjtj/y, j = f, m). The 
distributional significance of this effect is expressed by y. If 6= 1, then y= 1, 
and the whole term vanishes. If, say, 6 > 1, then y,/y= 1 implies y = 1 and 
again the whole term vanishes: the effect on f’s imputed income of a change 
in the marginal tax rate is exactly offset by the effect on the cost of her 
consumption. More generally, however, yJy< 1, and so 1 -y >O, and the net 
effect of this term is to increase ~3S/Zfi,. The smaller is y,/y, for given 6 > 1, 
the greater this latter effect. 
The terms in (25) can be interpreted in a similar way. Here we simply note 
that if 6 > 1, then (3sJ~Y/3,,, >O implies (6 &Jag,) + (c%,/c?~,,,) ~0, and so 
as/a/J,,, will be less than it would be in the absence of household distribu- 
tional effects. Moreover, l/S acts as a kind of discount factor, reflecting the 
lower social significance of the marginal benefit to m of a reduction in his 
marginal tax rate. In this case, other things being equal, an optimal tax 
formula would have a higher marginal tax rate for m than in the case where 
household distributional effects are absent or excluded. 
The purpose of the analysis in this section has been to show as simply but 
as generally as possible how household distributional effects influence the 
social valuation of changes in tax parameters. However, although the 
analysis has brought out the significance of the terms dsj/daj and L7sj/apj, the 
model here is too general to say very much about their signs. The Pareto- 
efficiency property of the household equilibrium alone is not sufficient to 
allow analysis of these effects, more structure is required. We pursue this 
point in the following section. 
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4. Household redistribution 
The general characterisation of the household equilibrium by the efficiency 
conditions (8)<11) allows us to bring out in a general way the significance of 
household distribution effects, but does not itself allow a precise analysis of 
these. For this it is necessary to specify how the household distributes 
income among its members, and this requires a more substantive hypothesis 
than that the final allocation is Pareto efficient. A key distinction here 
concerns whether or not the household members are assumed to pool their 
incomes. This in a sense reflects the difference between the situations in 
which lump-sum income redistributions are or are not possible in the 
analysis of economic policy for the economy as a whole. 
Consider, for example, the change recently made to the U.K. income tax 
structure, whereby primary earners ceased to receive a tax allowance for 
dependent children, and instead family allowance was increased. It was 
argued that this would improve the distribution of income within the 
household since primary earners are typically men and family allowance is 
usually collected by women. As we shall see, under fairly general conditions, 
in a model in which incomes are pooled, such a change would have no effect 
on the household income distribution provided it left total household income 
unchanged, while in a non-pooling model such as that in Apps and Jones 
(1986) it has a fully redistributive effect. It is clearly important for family 
taxation policy that we have empirical evidence on the extent to which lump- 
sum income redistribution takes place within households. 
Models based on a household utility function implicitly, and the Nash 
bargaining model of Manser and Brown (1980) explicitly, assume complete 
pooling of household incomes. In any model that makes this assumption, we 
find that the ‘identity tag’ of a lump-sum payment matters only if the 
reservation utility of that individual is in some sense a binding constraint at 
the household equilibrium (in a Nash bargaining model of course the 
reservation utilities constitute the ‘threat points’ and so will always influence 
the outcome). To show this, we take the model of section 2 literally, now, as 
a description also of how the household achieves an equilibrium. The house- 
hold members agree upon a household welfare function which expresses 
the intra-household distributional judgements. Moreover, no serious general- 
ity is lost if we take the ratio of partial derivatives of this function at the 
household equilibrium as locally constant, so we can continue to denote this 
by 6. Thus, the household makes its lump-sum redistributions in such a way 
as to solve the problem: 
m=km U’(P, 1,) + dU”(P, I ) 
s.t. 
sf+s,=tlf+c1, and 
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and we then carry out in the usual way the comparative statics analysis of 
the effects of changes in c(~ and /Ij, to obtain the derivatives:iO 
as, as, -=--- 
aM, aurn =Su~>O, 
as,+ 41 
--==>o, 
ax, aa, v:,+v;; 
as, V:,W,T + (II:, - ~I~c,w,, o. as, as, 
aBf- -(vL+G) < ’ ap,- ag,’ 
as, -zzIz ~v;“w,T+(u:,-GV~~)C,W,, o, as,,, as, _= -~ 





We then see from (27) and (28) that, as is intuitively obvious, the identity 
of the recipient of the lump sum is irrelevant to its effects on the household 
income distribution. However, as we shall soon show, this is only because it 
is implicitly assumed that no reservation utility constraints are binding at the 
optimum. Given this, it is clear that any redistribution of lump sums between 
the two individuals which leaves total household income unaffected has no 
impact on the household income distribution. 
The values of the derivatives themselves in (27) and (28) reflect the 
equilibrium condition that u: = 6~7. Then, an increase in a lump-sum 
payment to the household, whoever the nominal recipient, causes both 
individuals’ imputed incomes to rise in order to maintain this equality. This 
is in direct contrast to Apps’ trade model, where, in effect, the household 
accepts whatever income distribution results from trade of domestic for 
market goods. 
The derivatives in (29) and (30) involve two effects, an income effect and a 
price effect, which unfortunately may work in opposite directions. For 
example, in (29), the first term, u:,w,~: is an income effect. A reduction, say, 
in f’s marginal tax rate increases her imputed income, and that of the 
household, at the rate w,7: In order to maintain the equality vi =Su;l, with p 
fixed, her share in the lump sum must be reduced at the rate 
(v~,/(v~, +z$‘,))wr7Y In effect she has to pay over some proportion of the 
increase in her after-tax wage rate, by giving m a higher share in the lump 
sum. The second term, (v:,- Gu~~)c,w, arises because the change in f’s 
‘OFor convenience we write &1’/~3l, as vj. and dzui/dlf, as vi,, etc. 
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after-tax wage causes a change in price of the domestic good and hence in 
general a change in marginal utilities of income. Then, the allocation of the 
total lump sum has to be adjusted in whatever way is required to maintain 
the equality u~=Su~. A priori, this term could be either positive or negative 
and so could the derivative overall. 
These results change quite sharply if a reservation utility is binding at the 
equilibrium. To fix ideas, suppose that at the household equilibrium f is at 
her reservation utility ~7’. We regard this utility as representing what she 
could achieve if she left the household in question, and would expect it to be 
an increasing function V’(cr,, pf) of the tax parameters. In other words, the 
higher her net of tax income as an individual, the higher her reservation 
utility in this household. In this case, the household income distribution can 
be found by solving the problem: 
max u”(P, I,) 
St-,Srn 
s.t. 
u’(p, I,) 2 V’(cr,, /If) and sf + s, = elf + cc, 
with, by assumption, the utility constraint binding at the optimum. The value 
of 6 in this case is then given by the reciprocal of the Lagrange multiplier 
attached to the utility constraint. 
The essential nature of the comparative statics results for this case is quite 
clear. Any change in a tax parameter that changes f’s reservation utility must 
be accompanied by an equal change in her utility level within the household, 
and so the household income distribution must change accordingly. Thus, we 
have: 
(31) 
The effect of a change in f’s lump sum is given by the ratio of her marginal 
utility of income in the alternative household (for example where she lives 
alone) to that in her present household. This need not exactly equal unity. 
For example, if $:> u: because, say, she would be ‘poorer”’ in her 
alternative household, then her share of the household lump sum must 
increase by more than her individual lump sum has increased, to meet the 
reservation utility constraint. In that case, of course, as,,,/&, ~0. Clearly, 
” By this we mean both that f’s imputed income could be lower in the alternative household 
(qss,) and the price of the domestic good higher (pzp). since each results in a lower value of 
the indirect utility function. 
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then, in this kind of case, reallocation of the lump sums olr and a,,, can have 
significant effects on the household income distribution via its effects on the 
alternatives f has to the household in question. Similarly, the effect of the 
change in f’s marginal tax rate depends on precisely how it changes her 
utilities in her present and alternative households, but if we assume that the 
price effects in the two households roughly cancel each other out, and that 
the marginal utility of income is higher in the alternative household, then her 
share of the lump sum in her present household would have to rise and m’s 
to fall. 
Changes in m’s tax parameters will of course leave f’s reservation utility 
unaffected, while a change in a, leaves f’s actual utility unchanged but a 
change in /I,,, causes f’s utility to change because of the price effect. Hence, 
we have: 
as, --vf ap -=P as, as, 




So, m bears the full effect of a change in his lump sum, but must compensate 
f for the price effect of a change in his marginal tax rate since her reservation 
utility is unchanged. 
Finally, as a further contrast to the results of the household welfare 
function model, we consider the ‘trade model’ of Apps (1982). No pooling of 
individual incomes takes place and no lump-sum redistribution is possible. 
The final equilibrium is reached from the individuals’ initial endowment 
points (a,-PiwiT), i=f, m, by trade at a fixed price. This then obviously 
implies the indirect utility functions u’(p, ai + BiwtT), i =f, m, and so we have 
for this model: 
g=v; g= ?(wf~f-(l-~)wf~f)~ 
as _v. ~=~(wJ,+(l-y)w,t,). 
aa, 6’ ag, 6 
(33) 
(34) 
Then, if 6 # 1, a redistribution of the lump sums can never be distributionally 
neutral. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have sought to explore the implications for tax policy of 
dissonance between social distributional preferences and the household 
distributional preferences implicit at a household allocation equilibrium. The 
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household utility function approach adopted so far in the literature entirely 
obscures this issue. Using a thoroughly neoclassical model of the householdn 
we have shown that a central issue is whether the household pools 
income or, equivalently, makes lump-sum redistributions among its members 
and, if so, whether any member is on his/her reservation utility constraint. It 
is straightforward to show how the expressions for the marginal social utility 
of individual tax parameters are affected by intra-household distributional 
considerations, and these could then easily be incorporated into theoretical 
analysis of optimal taxation and tax reform. The precise nature of the 
distributional terms, however, will depend on the way in which the house- 
hold allocates its resources, a topic on which economists seem to say 
surprisingly little. The appropriate response to this lack of knowledge does 
not, however, appear to us to be to suppress the issue. 
‘*A very similar model is analysed by Chiappori (1988), who is concerned with the 
implications of this type of approach for the analysis of labour supply. 
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